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A TRIBUTE TO FRANKLIND. CLECKLEY
In order to permit tacking of successive adverse possession claims,
the ultimate fact to be established is the intended and actual
transfer or delivery of possession to the grantee as successor in
ownership of such area not within the premises, as described in the
calls of a deed, but contiguous thereto. Privity means privity of
possession. It is the transfer of possession, not title, which is the
essential element.280
VIII. JUVENILE DELiNQUENCY LAW
4. Questioning a Juvenile
Interrogation of ajuvenile was the subject of State v. Sugg.28 1 Sugg stated,
"[t]he absence of a parent or counsel when a juvenile waives his rights is not
necessarily a bar to a voluntary Miranda waiver and ultimately a confession. 282
Justice Cleckley held,
[w]here neither legal counsel nor the parents are present during
interrogation, the greatest care must be taken by the trial court to
assure that the statement of the juvenile is voluntary, in the sense
not only that it was not coerced or suggested, but that it was not the
product of ignorance of rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright, or
despair.283
Moreover, "[t]he validity of a juvenile's waiver of his or her rights should be
evaluated in light of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the waiver, and
the presence or absence of the parents is but one factor to be considered in reaching
this determination."284 Finally, it was said that
[t]he appropriate inquiry in regard to parental notification is
whether, after a careful review of the record in its entirety, the
reasons underlying the delay in notifying the parents, as agreed to
280 Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.
281 456 S.E.2d 469 (W. Va. 1995).
282 Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.
283 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
284 Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
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by the juvenile, set forth a sufficient factual basis which support a
finding that the delay was initiated or suggested by the juvenile and
the police did nothing during the period of the delay to take
advantage of the juvenile's youth and inexperience. If a juvenile
affirmatively requests that his parents not be notified until after he
talks to the police and this request is not coerced or suggested by
the police, ajuvenile cannot take advantage of that discrete period
of time it takes to conduct the interview.28
B. Transferring Juveniles to Prison
The case of State v. Harris2 6 presented the issue of transferring a defendant
from a juvenile facility to the state penitentiary without holding a pretransfer
hearing as required by statute and prior case precedent. The initial question Justice
Cleckley had to determine was whether a plea agreement entered into by the
juvenile under the adult jurisdiction of the court rendered the statutory and case law
transfer rights inapplicable. Harris responded to that question as follows:
The test for determining whether a departure from State v.
Highland, 174 W.Va. 525, 327 S.E.2d 703 (1985), and W.Va.
Code, 49-5-16(b) (1982), is permitted is two-fold: (1) Was the
particular circumstance (the basis for the proposed departure)
adequately taken into consideration at the time the plea agreement
was accepted by the circuit court; and (2) If it was, were the plea
and the plea agreement a knowing and intelligent waiver of the
rights provided by Highland and W.Va. Code, 49-5-16(b). Thus,
the most important inquiry is whether there is evidence of a
knowing and intelligent waiver.8 7
Justice Cleckley reached the ultimate issue by holding that "[e]xcept in
specific, well-defined circumstances, a pretransfer hearing pursuant to W. Va. Code,
49-5-16(b) (1982), is not necessary when all the significant information is already
in the breast of the circuit court and there is no significant dispute between the
285 Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.
286 464 S.E.2d 363 (W. Va. 1995).
287 Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
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parties as to the accuracy and relevancy of the information. 288
C. Taking Juveniles into Custody
The case of State v. Todd Andrew H.289 required that Justice Cleckley
clarify the statutory procedure for taking a juvenile into custody without a warrant
or court order:
Under W. Va. Code, 49-5-8(b)(3) (1994), ajuvenile may be taken
into "custody" without a warrant or court order if the law
enforcement official has reasonable grounds to believe the child is
a runaway without just cause from the child's parents and the
health, safety, and welfare of the child is endangered. Thus, the
mere fact that a juvenile is a runaway is insufficient to take a child
into custody without a warrant or court order. The arresting officer
also reasonably must believe the runaway's health, safety, and
welfare are also in jeopardy. To satisfy this latter requirement,
there must be objective evidence that the juvenile: (1) was
behaving in a self-destructive way; (2) was exposed to imminent
physical harm; (3) was under the influence of drugs or alcohol; or
(4) was incoherent and confused. In the absence of these types of
circumstances, an officer should either obtain an arrest warrant or
court order or deliver the juvenile to his or her parents.29
IX. LAWYER DISCIPLINARY LAW
The case of Lawyer Disciplinary Board v. Vieweg29' required creating a
middle ground when a recommendation conflict exists between the Office of
Disciplinary Counsel and the Hearing Panel Subcommittee:
Where a conflict exists between Disciplinary Counsel and the
Hearing Panel Subcommittee of the Lawyer Disciplinary Board
with regard to the recommendations concerning a petition for
288 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
289 474 S.E.2d 545 (W. Va. 1996).
290 Id. at Syl.
291 461 S.E.2d 60 (W. Va. 1995).
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